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Part I: Introduction 
 On December 17, 2010, a young fruit vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on 
fire in front of the governor’s office in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. This followed a violent encounter 
with municipal inspectors and subsequent failed attempts to get justice. Some witnesses to the 
encounter claim that Bouazizi was “slapped” by a female inspector when he resisted confiscation 
of his goods.1 Though municipal investigators deny that Bouazizi was slapped, his family and 
other vendors “seemed to focus on the slap and Mr. Bouazizi’s wounded male pride.”2 Outside 
of his inner circle, Bouazizi’s ordeal and self-immolation triggered a pro-democracy revolution 
in Tunisia that culminated in the ousting of Ben Ali and inspired similar uprisings throughout the 
Middle East and North Africa. 
 Tunisia has long had a reputation for progressive values. Tunisian women have more 
formal rights than most of their counterparts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
Despite that reputation, Tunisia is still a traditionally patriarchal society, with entrenched notions 
about masculinity, as illustrated by some people’s reaction to Bouazizi incident. Throughout 
Tunisian history, women's rights have been implemented from the top down. In Ben Ali's 
Tunisia, street vendors could be humiliated and denied the right to question government power; 
but women could participate in that power, as long as they didn’t question it. The revolution that 
overthrew the Ben Ali regime might have liberated the common man from government tyranny, 
but its implications for the future of women's rights, status, and government representation are 
unclear.  
                                                          
1 Kareem Fahim, “Slap to a Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia,” New York Times, January 21, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/world/africa/22sidi.html?_r=1&pagewanted=2&src=twrhp  
2 Ibid. 
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Some scholars argue that gender and revolution are closely intertwined. Particularly in 
the Middle East and North Africa, Moghadam writes that “[W]omen and gender constitute an 
integral part of MENA’s histories and movements,” and debates about national identity and 
cultural authenticity are especially gendered.3 In the Arab Spring’s aftermath, there has been 
much discussion about what this revolution means for the affected nations’ economies, politics, 
societies, and so on. This paper will explore the Arab Spring’s potential for promoting (or 
hindering) gender equality in MENA, focusing on Tunisia, because it was the origin of the Arab 
Spring, and has thus far experienced the most successful democratic transition out of the affected 
nations.   
 I define the Arab Spring as mass uprisings throughout MENA from 2010-2011 that 
overthrew longstanding authoritarian regimes and initiated democratic transitions. I seek to 
answer the following question: will the Arab Spring positively impact women’s rights, personal 
status, and governmental representation in Tunisia? I will compare Tunisia and Morocco to 
answer this question. Unlike Tunisia, Morocco did not experience regime change as a 
consequence of the Arab Spring, although it did see some political reforms passed to forestall the 
kind of mass uprising that happened in Tunisia. Out of all the countries in MENA, Morocco is 
the most similar to Tunisia. Thus, regime change as a consequence of the Arab Spring will be the 
independent factor.  
 I predict that the Arab Spring will have a positive impact on Tunisian women’s 
representation in parliament, as well as their formal rights under family law, because common 
sense dictates that democratization generally tends to be good for women’s rights. I want to 
investigate whether that common sense conclusion is correct. Fundamentally, this is about the 
                                                          
3 Valentine M. Moghadam, Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, 3rd ed. (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 40-41 
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relationship between democratization and women’s rights. I am focusing on women's 
representation in legislatures because it has a positive correlation with "the passage of more 
women-friendly policies."4 Women's formal rights under family law are also important because 
they affect women in a particularly gendered way, and are indicative of how democratic a society 
actually is.5 In Part II, I will discuss the historical evolution of women’s rights in Tunisia and 
Morocco. In Part III, I will provide a brief overview of current scholarship on democratization’s 
relationship with women’s rights. In Part IV, I will present the results of my own research, 
analyzing how the Arab Spring has affected women’s representation and rights thus far to predict 
the future. Results indicate that the first half of my hypothesis is wrong. In Part V, I will 
conclude the essay by suggesting that the Arab Spring’s full impact on Tunisian women’s rights, 
status, and representation remains to be seen, but that current trends foretell a positive outcome. 
Part II: Background 
Tunisia 
Tunisia is a predominantly Arab nation in North Africa’s Maghreb region, bordered by 
Libya to the east and southeast, Algeria to the west and southwest, and the Mediterranean Sea 
along its coastline in the north. It was ruled by France from 1881 to 1956, and French is still a 
major language in the country, although it does not have official status.6 The country’s first 
president was Habib Bourguiba, an authoritarian ruler who established Tunisia’s Code of 
Personal Status (CPS) in 1957, a group of laws that granted Tunisian women more rights than 
                                                          
4 Fallon p. 381 
5 Moghadam, “Modernizing Women,” 220 
6 “World Factbook: Tunisia,” Central Intelligence Agency, last modified January 12, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html. 
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their counterparts in other Middle Eastern and North African nations.7 In the pre-colonial era, the 
Maghreb region was characterized by tribalism and an overall lack of centralized government; 
however, Tunisia was less tribal than the other Maghreb nations, and the legacy of colonization 
further weakened the political autonomy of tribal communities.8 The post-colonial state 
formation process in Tunisia saw authoritarian rulers consolidating the power of the state, in part 
by weakening the power of tribal communities and Islamists. The CPS was one of several tools 
used in this endeavor, because tribal communities sustain their kinship-based social order partly 
by restricting women’s freedom.9 
According to El-Masri, Bourguiba was “deeply influenced by” Kemal Ataturk in seeking 
to establish a “nationalist, secularist and modernist society, which could not materialize without 
the active participation of half of the population: women.”10 The CPS was one of several 
methods used to reify Bourguiba’s vision. Among other things, it granted Tunisian women 
suffrage, the right to choose a marriage partner, and equal rights to divorce and child custody.11 
When Ben Ali took over in 1987, he continued the top-down approach of his predecessor to 
women’s rights. During the Ben Ali era, women’s representation in Tunisia’s government “was 
considerable in comparison to the other Arab states.”12  
Despite these gains for Tunisian women, some scholars, including El-Masri, point out 
that Tunisian feminism was almost entirely state-crafted. Progressive policies were created and 
implemented by the state, which also “coopted” women’s organizations, and both Bourguiba and 
                                                          
7 Mounira Charrad, “State and Gender in the Maghrib,” Middle East Report no.163 (1990): 21-22, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012553. 
8 Ibid., 22-23 
9 Ibid., 20 
10 Samar El-Masri, “Tunisian Women at a Crossroads: Cooptation or Autonomy?” Middle East Policy 22, no.2 
(2015): 126. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 128. 
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Ben Ali were ruthless in stifling all dissent, including feminist dissent.13 El-Masri argues that the 
“woman card” was essentially a tool used by the state to curry Western favor and to keep 
Islamists in check.14  
 To summarize, women’s rights have historically been enforced through a top-down 
process in Tunisia. This process denied women agency and used women's rights as a political 
tool. It was essentially a form of state feminism that failed to fully emancipate women as more 
liberal, radical, or Muslim feminists would prefer. Since the Arab Spring, which in Tunisia is 
often dubbed the “Jasmine Revolution,” Tunisia has experienced democratization.15 Tunisian 
women played an active role in the Revolution, but prior to this, women’s rights were dependent 
upon the very authoritarian regime that was overthrown in 2011. 
Morocco 
Morocco is a predominantly Arab nation in Africa’s Maghreb region. It is bordered to the 
east and southeast by Algeria, to the southwest by the disputed Western Sahara, and to the north 
and northwest by the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean. Like Tunisia, Morocco is a former 
French territory where French is still an important language.  
Morocco is a traditionally "tribal and kin based" society, like its fellow Maghreb 
nations.16 According to Charrad, Morocco has followed a different path than Tunisia in the 
formation of women's rights because of its state formation process, and the balance of power 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 125. 
15 Ibid., 134. 
16 Mounira M. Charrad, "States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco," 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 17. 
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between Morocco’s state and tribal groups.17 The Moroccan government's approach to women's 
rights has been to preserve the "social and political status quo."18  
After gaining independence from France in 1956, Morocco's monarchy established a 
ruling bargain with rural tribes. At the time of independence, Moroccan society is estimated to 
have been about 80 percent rural, and tribal groups dominate rural areas; this gave the tribes 
more political power in the state formation process than their Tunisian counterparts.19 Shortly 
after independence, several tribes led revolts against the monarchy, which likely stemmed from 
"fear of being left out" of the national political order.20 These revolts also put pressure on the 
monarchy to compromise with the tribes. In exchange for recognizing the monarchy's power, the 
tribes retained many of their traditional customs and laws.21 This included family law, which 
shapes women's rights and position in society. Moroccan family law, or the Moudawana, is a 
blend of conservative interpretations of Islamic law and traditional tribal customs.22 This family 
law reinforces the kin-based structure of tribal society, which is also essential to the monarchy's 
power.23  
From the start, there were voices calling for reform of Moroccan family law. Allal al-
Fasi, the leader of the Istiqlal, an urban nationalist movement that failed to supplant the 
monarchy's influence during the state-formation process, criticized traditional family law.24 He 
called for reforms that would do away with the extended patrilineal kinship networks that tribal 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 233 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 152 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 147 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 154 
24 Ibid., 159 
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society was based on, in favor of a more nuclear family structure befitting of "modern" society.25 
His suggested reforms would have improved women's rights, and in his view, promote harmony 
and unity in the nation.26 In the end, the Moroccan government chose the conservative route. 
In recent times, King Mohammed VI has proclaimed that he intends for Morocco to 
gradually liberalize economically, politically, and socially.27 In 2004, he initiated modest reforms 
to the Moudawana that tried to strike a balance between conservatives' demands and the 
pressures of international conventions.28 However, Moroccan women still have fewer and less 
expansive formal rights than their Tunisian counterparts. 
Application                                              
Has the Arab Spring had a positive impact on Tunisian women’s rights, status, and 
representation in government thus far? What impact, if any, will it have in the foreseeable 
future? Fundamentally, this is a question of whether or not democratization is good for women’s 
rights, status, and representation. Scholars of various disciplines, from sociology to political 
science, have considered this fundamental question. Their arguments are presented below. 
Part III: Democratization and Women’s Rights: What’s Their Relationship? 
 Democratization and women’s rights, or human rights more broadly, seem to be “two 
sides of the same coin.”29 Common sense dictates that democratization will naturally lead to an 
improvement in women’s rights. However, evidence shows that the relationship is not so 
straightforward. In my research I have identified two main perspectives on this relationship. The 
                                                          
25 Ibid., 160 
26 Ibid. 
27 Katja Zvan Elliot, "Morocco and its Women's Rights Struggle: A Failure to Live up to its Progressive Image," 
Journal of Middle East Women's Studies, 10.2 (2014): 1 
28 Ibid., 1 
29 Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 
2010): 9. 
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“Big Picture” perspective looks at overall trends, and suggests that democratization tends to have 
a positive impact on women’s rights in the long term, though not always in the short term. The 
“Mobilization” perspective flips the relationship, and suggests that pre-existing women’s rights 
and women’s political participation/mobilization shape the trajectory of democratization and its 
effect on women’s rights. I find that these two perspectives are not diametrically opposed. For 
my purposes, the “Mobilization” perspective is more useful.  
The “Big Picture” Perspective 
 This school of thought argues that democracies are generally better for human rights, and 
by extension, women’s rights, than authoritarian regimes. Carothers summarizes the 
“democratization = human rights” argument rather elegantly. Essentially, certain human rights, 
such as the right to free expression, go hand-in-hand with democracy. Therefore, the more 
democratic a country becomes, the better it will promote and implement human rights.30 Its 
straightforwardness makes this argument appealing. 
However, many scholars qualify this position by acknowledging that democratization can 
be detrimental to human rights, especially in the short run. As Donnelly notes, even in stable 
democracies, a majority group can “choose to do some very nasty things” to more vulnerable 
groups.31 Sorensen writes that democratization can cause chaos and instability, which usually 
leads to more human rights violations than in authoritarian regimes.32 If democratization results 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2013): 31.  
32 Georg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World, 3rd ed. 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 2008): 130. 
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in a “stable and consolidated democracy,” then it is good for human rights, and by extension, 
women’s rights.33  
Focusing specifically on the relationship between democratization and women’s 
representation in government, which has an effect on women’s rights, some scholars note that 
there appears to be a “paradox.”34 Fallon et al. cite studies which suggest that democratization 
seems to have little effect on women’s representation in legislatures, and when it does have a 
perceptible effect, it’s often negative.35 To explain this paradox, Fallon et al. conducted an 
exhaustive survey of countries that went through democratic transitions between 1975 and 2009. 
In their analysis, they conclude that certain factors in the democratization process affect 
women’s representation in legislatures.36 Among these factors are: “a nation's pre-democratic 
regime type, the global context of its democratic transition, its historical experiences with 
elections, and its changing levels of democratic freedoms over time.”37 For example, countries 
that are recovering from violent internal conflicts tend to see higher representation of women in 
legislatures.38 Overall, Fallon et al. find that democratization’s effect on women’s representation 
is “curvilinear”: women’s representation drops in the short term, but gradually increases in the 
long term.39 As a country experiences more elections, and adjusts to having a democratic system, 
women become increasingly better equipped to navigate electoral politics.40 Higher 
representation of women in legislatures correlates positively with “women-friendly” laws.41 This 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 
34 Katherine M. Fallon, Liam Swiss, and Jocelyn Viterna, “Resolving the Democracy Paradox: Women’s 
Representation in Developing Nations, 1975 to 2009,” American Sociological Review 77, no. 3 (2012): 381, DOI: 
10.1177/0003122412443365. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 391 
39 Ibid., 395 
40 Ibid., 391 
41 Ibid., 381 
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ties in to Sorensen’s argument that democratic consolidation is important to the success of 
democratization and its effect on human rights.  
In summary, the “Big Picture” school looks at overall trends. It argues that 
democratization can negatively affect women’s rights in the short run, especially if it’s not done 
properly. But in the long run, democratization tends to be more conducive to women’s rights 
than authoritarian regimes. So, this school of thought would answer “yes” to my research 
question. 
The “Mobilization” Perspective 
 Some scholars argue that it is women’s political mobilization that has a positive impact 
on democratization, and subsequently, on women’s rights. The more active women are in the 
“public sphere,” the stronger civil society becomes, which translates into consolidating 
democracy, and the more favorable the democratization process becomes to women’s rights.42 
This is because women's activism is usually inclusive and democratic.43 Women must be actively 
involved in the process from the start if democratization is to have a positive effect on women’s 
rights and representation in government. Applying this to the Arab Spring in North Africa, 
Moghadam argues that the level of women’s involvement in civil society, along with their pre-
existing legal status (and other factors), “helps to explain the divergent outcomes” between the 
North African nations.44 Thus, progressive Tunisia saw a more successful outcome than 
conservative Egypt.  
                                                          
42 Valentine M. Moghadam, “What is democracy? Promises and perils of the Arab Spring,” Current Sociology 61, 
no. 4 (2013): 396, DOI: 10.1177/0011392113479739. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Valentine M. Moghadam, “Democratization and Women’s Political Leadership in North Africa,” Journal of 
International Affairs 68, no. 1 (2014): 74.  
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 However, women’s movements are not always unified. Focusing specifically on 
Tunisia’s civil society after the Jasmine Revolution, Debuysere observes that there is a divide 
between secular women’s rights activists and their Islamist counterparts. The split is over what 
paradigm should be used to frame women’s issues – the liberal paradigm favored by secularists, 
or the religious paradigm favored by Islamists.45 This ideological divide reflects a deeper socio-
economic and geographic divide between Tunisian women; secular activists tend to be affluent 
and urban, whereas Islamist activists tend to be working-class/poor and rural.46 Although 
Tunisian women have relatively more rights than their counterparts in other Arab nations, not all 
Tunisian women approve of the CPS. This fragmentation is not necessarily an obstacle to 
change, and it may even strengthen Tunisia’s democratic transition.47 Nonetheless, as Williams 
explains, the political efficacy of feminism relies on, among other things, inclusiveness and 
intersectionality.48 For Tunisian women to maintain the gains they have acquired, they need to 
strike a balance between stifling uniformity and ineffective plurality.  
 In summary, the “Mobilization” school examines how women’s political participation, 
and women’s rights, shapes the democratization process. It flips the relationship between these 
two variables. Generally, democratization succeeds where women already have some rights and 
are politically and socially active. The nature of women’s political mobilization also matters – it 
must embody democratic values. This school of thought’s answer to my research question is a 
resounding “maybe.” 
                                                          
45 Loes Debuysere, “Tunisian Women at the Crossroads: Antagonism and Agonism between Secular and Islamist 
Women’s Rights Movements in Tunisia,” Mediterranean Politics 21, no. 2 (2016): 229, DOI: 
10.1080/13629395.2015.1092292. 
46 Ibid., 227 
47 Ibid., 240 
48 Susan H. Williams, “A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society,” Indiana Law Journal 72, no. 2 (1997): 428, 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol72/iss2/5.   
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Evaluation 
  These two schools of thought are not diametrically opposed. There is some overlap. Both 
perspectives agree that simply changing an authoritarian regime to a democratic one is not 
enough to improve women’s rights. They concur that are many variables that shape 
democratization’s effect on women’s rights. To account for these variables, I have decided to 
conduct my research by doing a comparative analysis of Tunisia and Morocco. While these two 
countries have many differences, they are also similar enough to control for some factors like 
international intervention and demographics.  
 Overall, I find the “Mobilization” perspective more useful than the “Big Picture” 
perspective. This is mainly because the “Mobilization” perspective gives me a better idea of how 
to frame my analysis. It would be easy for me to conclude, if I find that Tunisian women’s 
representation in parliament increased by a higher change in percentage after the Revolution than 
before the Revolution, that the Arab Spring has had a positive impact on women’s rights. With 
the “Mobilization” perspective, I will keep in mind that the opposite could be true – it could be 
that women’s rights had a positive impact on the Arab Spring in Tunisia. By anticipating 
alternative explanations to the data, I will be able to strengthen my thesis.   
Part IV: Research and Analysis 
 For this section, I will compare and contrast Tunisia and Morocco. This is to control for 
the Arab Spring factor; while Tunisia experienced regime change as a result of the Arab Spring, 
Morocco didn’t. These countries have several similarities. They are both Maghreb countries that 
were formerly ruled by France, and retain French as a major language. Their median ages are in 
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the same ballpark: 28.9 years for Morocco49 and 32.4 years for Tunisia.50 Their respective 
populations are also highly urbanized: Morocco’s urban population makes up 60.2% of its total 
population,51 and Tunisia’s urban population is 66.8% of its total population.52 The most 
important difference to keep in mind is that Morocco is a constitutional monarchy,53 whereas 
Tunisia is a republic.54  
 Some might argue that differences in levels of religiosity and modernization are as 
equally important as governmental structure in determining the trajectory of women’s rights; that 
the less religious and more “modern” a country is, the friendlier it is to women. With regard to 
religiosity, it may or may not be true that Moroccan society is more religious than Tunisian 
society – though I don’t know how or if this could be measured. It’s worth noting that, according 
to Moghadam, “Islam is neither more nor less patriarchal than other major religions,” and like 
other religions, it is “fundamentally ‘plastic.’”55 Whether Islam is used to justify oppressing 
women or empowering them depends on various contextual factors. Furthermore, the extent to 
which religion influences Moroccan or Tunisian politics is heavily dependent on the state 
formation process. As explained in Part II, religious conservatives had more political influence in 
Morocco during the state formation process than in Tunisia. As for modernization, this too is 
largely shaped by government policies and structure. 
I will use quantitative and qualitative analysis. For my quantitative analysis, I will 
measure trends in the percentage of women in the national parliaments of Tunisia and Morocco. I 
                                                          
49 “The World Factbook: Morocco,” Central Intelligence Agency, last modified January 12, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html 
50 “The World Factbook: Tunisia,” Central Intelligence Agency, last modified January 12, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html 
51 CIA, “World Factbook: Morocco” 
52 CIA, “World Factbook: Tunisia” 
53 Ibid. 
54 CIA, “World Factbook: Tunisia” 
55 Moghadam, “Modernizing Women,” 6-9 
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will calculate the change in percentage of women in each country’s national parliament before 
and after the Arab Spring. If I find that Tunisia sees a relatively higher change in percentage of 
women in parliament after the Arab Spring than Morocco does, I will take this as confirmation of 
the Arab Spring’s positive impact. If Tunisia has a lower change in percentage, or its change in 
percentage is roughly equal to Morocco’s, this will demonstrate that the Arab Spring has not had 
a positive impact. 
For my qualitative analysis, I will examine family laws in both Morocco and Tunisia. The 
reason I am focusing on family laws is because these laws are uniquely gendered, and shape 
women’s status in society. I will also consider other legal instruments that affect women’s 
rights/status, such as constitutions. If I find that there are comparatively greater improvements 
made in Tunisia than in Morocco after the revolution, this will confirm my hypothesis. If there 
have been no improvements or changes at all, this will reject my hypothesis. 
I am investigating how the Arab Spring has affected Tunisia and Morocco thus far to 
predict how it will affect them in the future. My analysis is based on the assumption that current 
trends will hold. After examining the evidence, I will attempt to explain why the revolution did 
or did not positively impact women’s rights. For my explanation, I will draw upon the 
“Mobilization” perspective.  
Of course, my research into this matter is far from conclusive. Women’s representation in 
parliament does not guarantee that ordinary women will see real changes in their lives. The same 
applies to legal rights, which must be enforced for women to actually benefit from them. Indeed, 
in Tunisia, urban women benefit most from the rights enshrined in the CPS, whereas rural 
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women frequently don’t have access to them.56 However, women’s representation and 
family/personal status laws can be useful for determining the overall trajectory of women’s 
rights. 
Women in Parliament 
 Drawing upon statistics provided by the International Parliamentary Union’s “Women in 
National Parliaments” database, which covers the years 1997 to 2017, I have constructed the 
figures below.57 The numbers in Figure 1.1 represent the percentage of women in parliament in 
January of each year.58 Figure 1.2 represents this data visually. Overall, Tunisia maintains higher 
levels of women’s representation in its parliament.  
Figure 1.1 
Year Morocco Tunisia 
1997 0.6 6.7 
1998 0.6 6.7 
1999 0.6 7.4 
2000 0.6 11.5 
2001 0.6 11.5 
2002 0.6 11.5 
2003 10.8 11.5 
2004 10.8 11.5 
2005 10.8 22.8 
2006 10.8 22.8 
2007 10.8 22.8 
2008 10.5 22.8 
2009 10.5 22.8 
2010 10.5 27.6 
2011 10.5 27.6 
                                                          
56 Sanja Breslin Kelly and Julia Breslin, Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid 
Resistance, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), ProQuest edition, 381 
57 Women in National Parliaments Statistical Archive, International Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-
e/classif-arc.htm 
58 For 2002, I’m using February’s data because January’s isn’t available for that year. 
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2012 17 26.7 
2013 17 26.7 
2014 17 28.1 
2015 17 31.3 
2016 17 31.3 
2017 20.5 31.3 
 
Figure 1.2 
 
Interestingly, both Morocco and Tunisia see periods of stagnation, where the percentage 
of women remains the same for two or more years before seeing an increase or decrease. This is 
especially apparent in Morocco’s data. This is because of their different election cycles. Prior to 
the Revolution, Tunisia had parliamentary elections every five or six years. Morocco had 
parliamentary elections in 1997, 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2016, which matches the years in Figure 
1.1 where the percentage changes.  
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Percentage per Year
Morocco Tunisia
Abdilahi 18 
 
In Tunisia’s data, there is a slight dip after the removal of Ben Ali: Tunisia goes from 
27.6 in 2011 to 26.7 in 2012 and 2013, but picks back up starting in 2014. This matches Fallon 
et. al’s findings that democratization tends to have a short-term negative impact on women’s 
representation in national legislatures, but a positive impact in the long run. Overall, both 
countries see a steady increase in women’s representation, although they have both used quota 
systems. 
The data points for 2011, which were taken in January that year, are the last data points 
before the Arab Spring (regime change in Tunisia). Using the equation below to calculate the 
average change in percentage of women in Tunisia’s parliament from 1997-2011, the result is the 
following: 
(((27.6-6.7)/6.7)/(2011-1997)) * 100% = 22.28% 
 For the average change in percentage from 2011-2017, it’s: 
 (((31.3-27.6)/27.6)/(2017-2011)) * 100% = 2.23% 
2.23 is about 10% of 22.28, so after the ouster of Ben Ali, Tunisia has seen a growth in women’s 
representation that is 10% of what it used to be.  
 Calculating the average change in percentage of women in Morocco’s parliament from 
1997-2011, the result is the following: 
 (((10.5-0.6)/0.6)/(2011-1997)) * 100% = 117.86% 
 For the average change in percentage from 2011-2017, it’s: 
 (((20.5-10.5)/10.5)/(2017-2011)) * 100% = 15.87% 
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15.87 is about 13.47% of 117.86, so Morocco has seen a growth in women’s representation that 
is 13.47% of what it used to be.  
 Granted, the post-Arab Spring data set is smaller than the pre-Arab Spring data set. I’ve 
accounted for this by dividing the change in percentages by the number of years. According to 
these calculations, growth in women’s representation has slowed down considerably in both 
countries in recent years. However, Morocco, which has not been affected by the Arab Spring as 
I define it (regime change), has retained a higher rate of growth compared to its previous rate 
than Tunisia has. This means that the Arab Spring has not had a positive impact on women’s 
representation in Tunisia’s parliament thus far.   
Family Law and Personal Status 
 Morocco’s family law, also known as the Moudawana, is codified. The Moudawana was 
most recently updated in 2004, in response to popular demands for reform.59 Freedom House, 
which releases a report every five years on women’s rights and freedoms around the world, gives 
Morocco a rating of 2.9 in “Social and Cultural Rights,” with 1 being the lowest possible score 
and 5 being the highest.60 Under the Moudawana, women must be “of sound mind and have 
completed eighteen full Gregorian years of age,” though there are some exceptions for minors.61 
While the 2004 Moudawana improves upon the original in several ways, it’s still fairly 
conservative.  
                                                          
59 Sanja Breslin Kelly and Julia Breslin, Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid 
Resistance, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), ProQuest edition, 243 
60 Ibid., 242.  
61 The Moroccan Family Code (Moudawana) of February 5, 2004: An unofficial English translation of the original 
Arabic text, Human Rights Education Associates, http://www.hrea.org/programs/gender-equality-and-womens-
empowerment/moudawana/ 
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 In Tunisia, family law and other areas of the law that uniquely impact women are 
codified through the Code of Personal Status (CPS). Freedom House gives Tunisia a rating of 3.3 
in “Social and Cultural Rights.”62 Under the original CPS, women have the right to divorce (with 
restrictions), own property, child custody, and various other rights.63 The CPS grants Tunisian 
women more rights than their Moroccan counterparts. 
 Aside from family law, the rules affecting personal status are important. In post-Arab 
Spring Tunisia, there was a political “firestorm” over the issue of women’s role in society as 
defined in their new constitution.64 Ennahda (or al-Nahda), the prominent Islamist party in 
Tunisia, released a draft of the new constitution that seemed to define women’s personal status as 
“complementary” to men in 2012.65 In response to backlash, the constitution was revised to 
unambiguously define women’s role as “equal” to men.66 This incident reveals a couple of 
things. Firstly, as Tunisian politics and government has become more pluralistic, conservatives 
and progressives have to compromise. Secondly, conservatives like Ennahda are willing to 
compromise. Thirdly, even in the absence of government coercion, Tunisian society values 
gender equality to the extent that many Tunisians are willing to fight for them. Progress in 
women’s rights is no longer enforced from the top down; it now must come from political 
consensus. This is likely better for women’s rights because consensus makes progress more 
legitimate in the eyes of the public. Legitimacy may grant progress more stability than if it were 
forced upon the people.  
                                                          
62 Ibid., 380 
63 George N. Sfeir, “The Tunisian Code of Personal Status,” Middle East Journal 11, no. 3 (1957): 310-312 
64 Monica L. Marks, “Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution,” 
Brookings Doha Center, no. 10 (2014): 22 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 23 
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 As of writing, neither the Moudawana nor the CPS has been changed significantly since 
the Arab Spring, although this is likely because it’s only been six years since Ben Ali was 
overthrown. This means that the Arab Spring has not impacted Tunisian women’s rights under 
family law thus far, even though they still fare better than their counterparts in most of the 
region. However, the events surrounding the drafting of the new Tunisian constitution indicate 
that there are strong political forces pulling in the direction of progress. It is likely that the CPS 
will change for the better. Thus, my hypothesis has been confirmed.  
Discussion 
 As shown above, my hypothesis that the Arab Spring has had a positive impact on 
Tunisian women’s representation in parliament and their formal rights has been half rejected and 
half confirmed. My hypothesis is far from perfect, of course. To interpret this information, I will 
now turn to the “Mobilization” school of thought.  
  Applying the “Mobilization” perspective as explained by Moghadam, “those countries 
that saw advances in women's participation and rights prior to the Arab Spring are the ones most 
likely to transition successfully beyond mere democracies to more women-friendly ones.”67 
Tunisia did see improvements in women’s representation in parliament shortly before the Arab 
Spring, and women have been very politically active during the democratization process.68 
Tunisian attitudes toward gender are more liberal than in other MENA countries.69 Indeed, 
several pre-existing factors increased the likelihood of a “women-friendly outcome”: 
comparatively high female economic participation, longstanding secular/liberal traditions, and 
                                                          
67 Moghadam, “Democratization and Women’s Political Leadership in North Africa,” 60 
68 Ibid., 71 
69 Ibid., 66 
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higher-than-average share in parliament.70 One could argue that the Arab Spring has had little 
impact on women’s rights because Tunisian women were already politically active and had 
substantial rights. 
 However, the Arab Spring opened up Tunisia’s political system. Removing Ben Ali from 
power enabled other political forces to mobilize more freely, including women’s rights groups 
and women in general; so, the Arab Spring led to an increase in women’s political mobilization. 
According to the “Mobilization” perspective, this should lead to both a more successful 
democratic transition and to improvements in women’s rights/status/representation. Although 
time will ultimately tell what the revolution has done for Tunisian women, based on current 
trends, I predict that the Arab Spring will probably have a positive impact on Tunisian women’s 
rights, status, and representation in government.  
V: Conclusion 
 I have sought to predict whether the Arab Spring will have a positive impact on Tunisian 
women’s rights, status, and representation in government. I have discussed the historical 
evolution of Tunisian women’s rights, the role of Tunisia’s authoritarian regimes in promoting 
women’s rights, and what scholars have to say on the relationship between democratization and 
women’s rights in general. I have conducted my own research on the matter, comparing Tunisia 
to Morocco to control for the Arab Spring factor. With regard to women’s representation in 
parliament, the Arab Spring does not seem to have had a positive impact yet; as for women’s 
legal rights/status, there has been a positive impact, as illustrated by the controversy over 
Tunisia’s new constitution. If current trends hold, and as the Arab Spring has opened up 
Tunisia’s political system, enabling women’s rights groups and women in general to mobilize 
                                                          
70 Valentine M. Moghadam, “Modernizing Women,” 230. 
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more freely, I predict that the Arab Spring will have a positive impact on Tunisian women’s 
rights, status, and representation in the long run.    
 This does not mean that Tunisia will become a feminist paradise. The Mohamed Bouazizi 
incident mentioned in Part I, and his relatives’ reaction to it, indicates that Tunisia (like most 
societies) is traditionally patriarchal. Even in post-industrial Western nations, women face 
obstacles to full equality. What my research suggests is that the Arab Spring will have a positive 
impact, but the extent of this impact is beyond the scope of this paper. Additionally, what this 
paper suggests for the relationship between democratization and women’s rights can be summed 
up as: “It’s complicated.” There are numerous factors that shape democratization’s effect on 
women’s rights, and vice versa. Ultimately, what the Arab Spring truly means for women’s 
rights remains to be seen. 
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